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Finally, there is the rather obvious requirement that the
sale of the trust property must be in furtherance of the
trust purpose.12  Only that amount of alienation necessary
to preserve or accomplish the trust purpose will be allowed.' 3
Although no case has been found in which he was required to
show that the requested sale was the most expedient remedy,
a petitioner might wisely be prepared to prove that, if other
remedies do exist, sale of the property in question is the
remedy best calculated to' save the trust purpose from im-
pairment.14
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
TEST OF CAUSATION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT
AND INJURY
A powder plant employee was killed by lightning while
proceeding to shelter pursuant to his employer's instructions.
In a proceeding for workmen's compensation, experts gave
conflicting testimony regarding whether the employee was
more exposed to lightning than others in the same locality
who were not engaged in the same pursuit. The Indiana
Appellate Court affirmed an award of compensation. It held
that since the employee would not have been at the place
where the lightning struck at the time it struck except for
his employment, there was sufficient causative connection
between the employment and the death by lightning.' On
transfer to the Supreme Court the award was affirmed, but
on a different ground. The Supreme Court held that the
employment "caused" the death, since the Industrial Board
could properly find from the evidence that the employee's
568, 126 Atl. 610 (1924). On the advisability of using conditions
precedent and subsequent as a means for discouraging sale see Scobey
v. Beckman, 111 Ind. App. 574, 41 N. E.2d 847 (1942); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 401.2.
12. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931); Se-
curity-First National Bank v. Easter, 136 Cal. App. 691, 29 P.2d 422
(1934). See note 5 supra.
13. Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914);
Weakly v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1916).
14. But in Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Il. 225 (1854), the existence
of a better remedy moved the court to refuse to apply the doctrine of
cy pres in authorization of sale.




duties exposed him to an increased risk of being struck by
lightning. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 79 N. E.2d
387 (Ind. 1948).
In a compensation case the claimant must prove that his
injury resulted from an accident arising out of and occur-
ing in the course of the employment. 2  In most cases of
injury resulting from an act of God, the problem is whether
the injury is one "arising out of" the employment within
the meaning of the statute. All courts agree that the statu-
tory words refer to and require a causal connection, 3 but
there is no uniformity of opinion on the question of the pre-
cise .degree of causal connection necessary for compensation
rights.
Two general tests in determining sufficiency of causal
connection have been developed. Most courts, although using
differing verbal formulations of the test, make some sort of
increased risk a requisite factor to find legal causation.4 A
few courts have adopted the more lenient causal test ad-
vanced by the Indiana Appellate Court in this case.5 In
such jurisdictions the employee or his dependents need only
show that the employment exposed him to the hazard which
caused injury," or as some courts say, that the employment
2. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 40-1202: ". . . every employer
and every employee . . . shall be presumed to have accepted the pro-
visions of this act .. . for personal injury or death by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment ... 
3. E.g., In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913) from
which the following is frequently quoted: ". . . [an injury] arises 'out
of' the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon
consideration of the circumstances, a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the
resulting injury."
4. Some courts purport to determine whether the employee was
subjected to a greater risk than the ordinary person in the vicinity:
Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607, 53 A.2d 392 (1947) (frostbite);
Atlanta v. Parks, 60 Ga. App. 16, 2 S. E.2d 718 (1939) (lightning).
Others profess to question whether the employee was subjected to a
greater risk than the public generally: L. W. Dailey Construction Co.
v. Carpenter, 114 Ind. App. 522, 53 N. E.2d 190 (1940) (heatstroke);
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Walker, 203 S. W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) (heatstroke); Industrial Comm'n v. Laraway, 46 Ohio App. 168,
188 N. E. 297 (1933) (lightning). Still others attempt to decide
whether the employee was subjected to an increased or peculiar danger:
Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 229 *N. W. 138 (1930) (light-
ning) ; Many v. Bradford, 266 N. Y. 558, 195 N. E. 199 (1935) (light-
ning); Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 3 P.2d 844
(1931) (lightning); Nebraska Seed Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 206
Wis. 199, 239 N. W. 432 (1931) (lightning).
5. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTs 422 (1st ed. 1933).
6. Deziley v. Semet-Solvay Co., 272 App. Div. 985, 72 N. Y. S.
2d 809 (1947) (lightning); Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark.
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required him to be at the place where the injury occurred.7
In such a view, increased risk need not be shown.
The record of the Indiana Appellate Court follows a
pattern of vacillation between the strict and the lenient types
of causal tests. That court recognized in an early decision
that even though the risk to which an employee was sub-
jected was no greater than that of the others in the locality
there might still be causal connection.8 In later cases the
court held that the employee must be more exposed than
others in the locality,9 that the employee must be exposed to
different conditions than those of other employees,10 and
that the employee must be subjected to a greater hazard than
the general public"l in order to claim compensation. In the
last decade the court has been moving toward the simple
test advanced in the present case, simply that the employment
must have exposed the claimant to the injury for which he
seeks compensation. 12
Since the Supreme Court announced its jurisdiction in
866, 187 S. W.2d 961 (1945) (heat prostration); Hughes v. Trustees
of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N. Y. 201, 156 N. E. 665 (1927) (heat
prostration).
7. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233,
254 Pac. 995 (1927) (lightning); In re Harraden, 66 Ind. App. 298,
118 N. E. 142 (1917) (street risk).
8. In re Harraden, 66 Ind. App. 298, 118 N. E. 142 (1917).
9. Deckard v. Trustees of Indiana University, 92 Ind. App. 192,
172 N. E. 547 (1931).
10. Thompson v. Masonic Cemetery Ass'n, 103 Ind. App. 74, 5
N. E.2d 145 (1936).
11. L. W. Dailey Const. Co. v. Carpenter, 114 Ind. App. 522, 53 N.
E.2d 190 (1944); Townsend & Freeman Co. v. Taggart, 81 Ind. App.
610, 144 N. E. 556 (1924).
12. See Broderick Co. v. Flemming, 116 Ind. App. 668, 65 N. E.2d
257 (1946); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App.
483, 39 N. E.2d 499 (1942); Montgomery v. Brown, 109 Ind. App. 95,
27 N. E.2d 884 (1940). It is interesting to note that on April 4, 1949,
in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 84 N. E.2d 897
(Ind. App. 1949), the Appellate Court speaking through Bowen, J.,
seems to have continued its espousal of the simple causation test which
the Indiana Supreme Court had rejected. Without citing the instant
case, the court said, "While there is great confusion in the recorded
cases and the line of demarcation is not too clear when applied to the
facts of the particular cases, in determining the question presented
by this appeal, we must consider the general rule that an accidental
death arises out of the employment when there exists a causal con-
nection between it and the employment. To be compensable, the em-
ployment must be in some way responsible for the accidental injury,
which was drowning in the instant case, and, while the more recent
cases do not hold that an employee's injury by accident in order to be
compensable must arise out of the nature of the employment, the injury




worknen's compensation cases in 1940,13 it has not passed on
any cases involving an act of God. But the court has been
liberal in its interpretation of the compensation laws.
14 It
is therefore surprising that the Supreme Court should re-
pudiate the lenient test advanced by the lower court and
adopt the increased risk type test for causation. 15 The higher
court attempted to reconcile the conflicting decisions in cases
involving lightning and other acts of God by stating that
the decisions of the Industrial Board have always been up-
held when supported by any probative evidence. The court
decided that any lack of consistency may be attributed to
factual variations and the inevitable effect of sympathy for
injured employees and their dependents.16
For two reasons the Supreme Court's reliance on the
increased risk test seems unfortunate. Entirely aside from
the question of the intrinsic merit of that test, it has been
productive of nothing but confusion. Particularly in cases
of injury by lightning, where every holding has had its op-
posite,'1 the difficulty of applying the test with certainty is
13. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N. E.2d 399
(1940).
14. See, e.g., Patton Park Inc. v. Anderson, 222 Ind. 448, 53 N.
E.2d 771 (1944), where a compensation award was affirmed despite
objection that the workman was not under the control and supervision
of the employer's agent. Evidence to the contrary was objected to by
the employer as hearsay, but the court found that there was control
and declared that strict rules of evidence did not apply to the pro-
ceedings before the Industrial Board, which procedure the statute
provided shall be as summary and simple as reasonably possible. And
in Soetje & Arnold, Inc. v. Basney, 218 Ind. 538, 34 N. E.2d 26 (1941),
the court declared that in determining whether the finding of the
Board was supported by the evidence, any evidence unfavorable to the
finding must be disregarded and only favorable and reasonable in-
ferences therefrom should be considered.
15. The court cited and apparently approved Deckard v. Trustees
of Indiana University, 92 Ind. App. 192, 172 N. E. 547 (1931), a case
overruled by the Appellate Court in this case, and Illinois Country
Club, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 387 Ill. 484, 56 N. E.2d 786 (1944),
a case in which the Illinois Court reversed an award for injuries sus-
tained when a caddy was struck by lightning while standing under a
tree in wet clothes and carrying two bags of metal golf clubs.
16. Cf. Wells v. Robinson Const. Co., 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d 1059(1932); Illinois Country Club, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 387 Ill. 484,
56 N. E.2d 786 (1944); Mincey v. Dultmeir Mfg. Co., 223 Iowa 252,
272 N. W. 430 (1937) (which indicate an endeavor to keep the burden
off the employer).
17. A review of the lightning cases shows the diversity of results
obtained from application of the increased risk formula. See Note, 26
MicH. L. REv. 422 (1927); Note, 83 A. L. R. 235 (1933). In one of
the first American cases of injury by lightning, the court held that
a workman who took shelter under a tree was subjected to an increased




& Ice Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. 119 (1915). Cf.
De Luca v. Board of Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 107 Atl. 611
(1919). Contra: Deckard v. Trustees of Indiana University, 92 Ind.
App. 192, 172 N. E. 547 (1931). For occupants of buildings and
tents some courts recognize increased danger: Consolidated Pipe Line
Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 3 P.2d 844 (1931); Nebraska Seed Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 206 Wis. 199, 239 N. W. 432 (1931); Fort
Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So.2d 205 (1946).
Contra: Thier v. Widdifield, 210 Mich. 355, 178 N. W. 16 (1920)(barn); Fuqua v. Department of Highways, 292 Ky. 783, 168 S. W.2d
39 (1943) (garage); Griffith v. Cole Bros., 183 Iowa 415, 165 N. W.
577 (1917) (tent). Certain jurisdictions have found increased risk
in lightning cases due to the proximity of metal: Hassell Iron Works
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 70 Colo. 386, 201 Pac. 894 (1921) (em-
ployee welding on a steel bridge); Emmerick v. Hanrahan Brick & Ice
Co., 206 App. Div. 580, 201 N. Y. S. 637 (1923) (working near a
steel cable); Sullivan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena, 103 Mont.
117, 61 P.2d 838 (1936) (carrying a shovel and standing over a metal
pipe line); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Pool, 171 S. W.2d 135 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) (working near a boiler engine and under steel guy-
wires); Atlanta v. Parks, 60 Ga. App. 16, 2 S. E.2d 718 (1939) (spray-
ing disinfectant from a steel drum) ; Bauer's Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N.
E.2d 118 (1943) (standing near an iron bed and electric wiring);
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Conm'n, 77 Cal. App.
2d 461, 175 P.2d 884 (1946) (working near an iron pipe). Contra:
Wiggins v. Industrial Accident Board, 54 Mont. 335, 170 Pac. 9 (1918)(operating a metal road drag); Griffith v. Cole Bros., 183 Iowa 415,
165 N. W. 577 (1917) (standing near a pile of steel); Alizina Const.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. 395, 141 N. E. 191 (1923) (trucking
cement in a truck with steel wheels and steel braces); Wells v. Robin-
son Const. Co., 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d 1059 (1932) (plowing with a
metal plow); Mincey v. Dultmier Mfg. Co., 223 Iowa 252, 272 N. W.
430 (1937) (walking near a metal gate); Felden v. Horton & Coleman,
234 Mo. App. 421, 135 S. W.2d 1115 (1939) (holding a metal wrench);
Illinois Country Club, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 387 Ill. 484, 56 N. E.
2d 786 (1944) (carrying bags of golf clubs). Some courts recognize
a greater risk with increased altitude: Truck Insurance Exchange v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 77 Cal. App.2d 461, 175 P.2d 884 (1946);
Bauer's Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N. E.2d 118 (1943). Contra.: Netherton
v. Lightning Delivery Co., 32 Ariz. 350, 258 Pac. 306 (1927). For-
merly, the courts recognized no additional risk to a workman in the
open. Wiggins v. Industrial Accident Board, 54 Mont. 335, 170 Pac.
9 (1918); Hoenig v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Wis. 646, 150 N. W. 996(1915). But more recent decisions have held that any outdoor employ-
ment increases the danger of harm from lightning: Many v. Brad-
ford, 266 N. Y. 558, 195 N. E. 199 (1935); Mixon v. Kalman, 133 N.
J. L. 113, 42 A.2d 309 (1945).
18. Some courts stress the necessity for expert testimony to support
a finding of increased risk: Hassell Iron Works Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 70 Colo. 386, 201 Pac. 894 (1921). Other courts take judicial
notice of the increased risk in many instances: De Luca v. Board of
Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 107 Ati. 611 (1919); Madura v. City
of New York, 387 N. Y. 214, 144 N. E. 505 (1924). Generally, the
finding by the Industrial Board as to the presence or absence of in-
creased risk has been held conclusive: Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v.
Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So.2d 205 (1946); Fuqua v. Department of
Highways, 292 Ky. 783, 168 S. W.2d 39 (1943). Some courts, how-
ever, have substituted their own findings for that of the administrative
agency: Illinois Country Club, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 387 Ill. 484,
56 N. E.2d 786 (1944) (award of compensation reversed); Bauer's




A more serious objection to the increased risk test is
its tendency to undermine the purposes meant to be served
by the workmen's compensation statutes. The opinion of
the Appellate Court is more consistent with the spirit of the
workmen's compensation laws than the conservatism of the
Supreme Court. The requirement of an increased risk is a
relic of the common law theory of liability based on fault,
the very theory which the compensation laws attempted to
abolish. The compensation remedy does not adequately repay
the employee in cases where it is a substitute for common
law liability, but in return the employee is supposed to have
the advantage of a more certain and expeditious recovery in
all cases. The application of the increased risk test and its
consequent uncertainty impairs the statutory purpose and
makes compensation dependent upon the whim of the ad-
ministrative agency. 9  As was pointed out by the Appellate
Court in an earlier opinion, there is no sound reason for
such a test to determine causal connection. 20
19. See note 17 supra.
20. Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483, 39
N. E.2d 499 (1942). The court said therein: "Many of the limita-
tions upon the granting of compensation under the act are judicial
inventions wholly unjustified by the language of the act or the humane
purposes of the legislature in enacting it. There is nothing in the
language of the act that requires an employee's injury by accident
to arise out of the nature of the employment, nor is there anything
in the language of the Act that requires the risk to which the employee
is subjected to be different from the risk to which the general public
is subjected." Id. at 503-4, 39 N. E.2d at 507.
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